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ABSTRACT
We study how men’s dependence on their own employer for health insurance affects labor supply
responses and loss of health insurance coverage when faced with a serious health shock.  Men with
employment-contingent health insurance (ECHI) are more likely to remain working following some
kinds of adverse health shocks, and are more likely to lose insurance.  With the passage of health care
reform, the tendency of men with ECHI as opposed to other sources of insurance to remain employed
following a health shock may be diminished, along with the likelihood of losing health insurance.
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Background: Employment-contingent health insurance (ECHI) has been criticized for tying 
insurance to continued employment.  Our research sheds light on two central issues regarding 
employment-contingent health insurance: whether such insurance “locks” people who experience 
a health shock into remaining at work; and whether it puts people at risk for insurance loss upon 
the onset of illness, because health shocks pose challenges to continued employment. 
Objective: To determine how men’s dependence on their own employer for health insurance 
affects labor supply responses and health insurance coverage following a health shock.   
Data Sources: We use the Health and Retirement Study (HRS) surveys from 1996 through 2008 
to observe employment and health insurance status at interviews two years apart, and whether a 
health shock occurred in the intervening period between the interviews.       
Study Selection: All employed married men with health insurance either through their own 
employer or their spouse’s employer, interviewed in at least two consecutive HRS waves with 
non-missing data on employment, insurance, health, demographic, and other variables, and under 
age 64 at the second interview.  We limited the sample to men who were initially healthy. 
Data Extraction: Our analytical sample consisted of 1,582 men of whom 1,379 had ECHI at the 
first interview, while 203 were covered by their spouse’s employer.  Hospitalization affected 209 
men with ECHI and 36 men with spouse insurance.  A new disease diagnosis was reported by 
103 men with ECHI and 22 men with other insurance.  There were 171 men with ECHI and 25 
men with spouse employer insurance who had a self-reported health decline.  
Data Synthesis: Labor supply response differences associated with ECHI – with men with 
health shocks and ECHI more likely to continue working – appear to be driven by specific types 
of health shocks associated with future higher health care costs but not with immediate increases 
in morbidity that limit continued employment.  Men with ECHI who have a self-reported health 4 
 
decline are significantly more likely to lose health insurance than men with insurance through a 
spouse. 
Conclusion: Men with employment-contingent health insurance are more likely to remain 
working following some kinds of adverse health shocks, and are more likely to lose insurance.  
With the passage of health care reform, the tendency of men with ECHI as opposed to other 
sources of insurance to remain employed following a health shock may be diminished, along 





  Informs policies regarding the effects of employment-based health insurance on labor 
supply and continuity of health insurance among those experiencing health shocks.   
  Men with employer-provided health insurance appear to experience a form of job lock – 
or “employment lock” – following a health shock because of the ECHI incentives.  Prior 
estimates of “job lock” may understate the true effects of ECHI because they are 
confounded by a health shock’s negative impact on employment.  
  Those with ECHI are more likely to lose health insurance following some types of health 
shocks.    
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The merits and shortcomings of the U.S. system of health insurance, which is primarily 
employer-based for citizens under age 65, have been debated since its widespread adoption 
during and following World War II.  There has been a resurgence of this debate with the passage 
of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA).  Employer-based health insurance has 
often been criticized for constraining employment decisions or creating “job lock.”
[1-5]   
A goal of the ACA is to provide continuous health insurance coverage when an 
individual is diagnosed with a serious disease that raises future costs of health care.  Although 
the Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act (COBRA) allows employees to continue 
their employer-based health insurance coverage after they stop working, former employees pay 
the full cost of group coverage for a policy that is usually limited to 18 months – making 
COBRA a prohibitively expensive option for many and only a temporary measure for those who 
can afford the full cost of coverage.  Our research in this paper informs the debate about two 
central issues regarding employer-based health insurance: whether such insurance “locks” people 
who experience a health shock into remaining at work; and whether it puts people at risk for 
insurance loss upon the onset of illness, because health shocks pose challenges to continued 
employment.   
An unpublished study using Medical Expenditure Panel Survey (MEPS) data reports that 
nearly one in five individuals reporting fair or poor health lost coverage over a two-year 
period.
[6]  A qualitative study jointly conducted by the Kaiser Family Foundation and the 
American Cancer Society reported 20 case studies of cancer patients who faced financial 
difficulty as a result of gaps in the health insurance system.
[7]  One of the themes that emerged 6 
 
was “people who depend on their employer for health insurance may not be protected from 
catastrophically high health care costs if they become too sick to work” (p. 1).
  
Using primary data collected from a sample of Detroit women diagnosed with breast 
cancer, Bradley et al. found that women with insurance through their employer (“employment-
contingent health insurance,” or ECHI) are significantly more likely to remain employed relative 
to women whose insurance is not provided by their employer, and that ECHI reduces the 
negative impact of cancer on weekly hours worked.
[8]  The incentive ECHI creates to remain 
employed following a health shock should be stronger for men because fewer men are able to 
switch to their spouse’s policy.
[8]  Consistent with this prediction, Tunceli et al.
[9] report the 
tendency to remain employed after getting cancer if one has ECHI is strongest for men.  
While past research has focused on women, in this paper we focus on men.  The effects 
of ECHI on men’s behavior are particularly interesting because men are much more likely to get 
their health insurance through their employer than are women.  We compare the responses to 
health shocks of those who depend on their own employer for health insurance – who have ECHI 
– with the responses of those who obtain their health insurance through their spouse’s employer.  
Men with ECHI are very similar to men who depend on their wives for health insurance, 
implying that differences in how these two groups of men respond to health shocks may provide 
a good quasi-experiment to estimate the effects of dependence on one’s employer for health 
insurance.
i  Nonetheless, we also experiment with different comparison groups in order to obtain 
a sample of men who are solely dependent on their job for health insurance without the option to 
switch to a spouse’s policy, compared to men who are not dependent on their job for health 
insurance.  In addition, we estimate the effects of different types of health shocks by 
distinguishing between shocks that raise the future value of health insurance but do not cause an 7 
 
immediate reduction in functioning, and shocks that impose both immediate costs and morbidity 
on the worker.  This distinction helps us to measure the employment effects of ECHI without the 
confounding effects of morbidity, which would tend to dampen ECHI’s incentives to remain 
working.  
2. Empirical Approach 
We use data from the Health and Retirement Study (HRS) on employed married men 
with health insurance either through their own employer or their spouse’s employer.  In the HRS, 
we observe employment and health insurance status at interviews two years apart, and whether a 
health shock occurred in the intervening period between the interviews.   
The first outcome is remaining employed following a health shock, and the second 
outcome is loss of health insurance following a health shock.  The outcomes are modeled as 
functions of health shocks (HS), health insurance source prior to the shock (ECHI or spouse’s 
employer), control variables, and unobserved influences (ε).  We estimate the probability of 
employment (E) using 
Pr (Ei2 = 1| Ei1 = 1, INSi1 = 1, HSi1 = 0, ECHIi1, HSi12, Xi),        (1) 
where the ‘i ‘ subscript denotes individuals, and the ‘1’, ‘2’, or ‘12’ subscripts denote the first 
interview (period 1), second interview (period 2), or the intervening period.   
  The condition Ei1 = 1 implies that the respondent was employed at period 1, the condition 
INSi1 = 1 implies that he had insurance in period 1, and the condition HSi1 = 0 implies that he 
was healthy as of period 1, reflecting our sample selection rules.  The control variables in X 
include individual, spouse, and job characteristics.   
This equation is estimated as a linear probability model.  In addition to entering each of 
the variables linearly, we include interactions between HS and ECHI, using: 8 
 
Ei2 = α + β1HSi12·ECHIi1 + β2HSi12·(1 − ECHIi1) + β3ECHIi1 + Xiγ + εi2.     (2) 
In this model, β1 captures the effect of a health shock on employment for those with 
ECHI initially, and β2 captures the effect of a health shock on employment for those without 
ECHI initially.  The difference (β1 – β2) is then the difference-in-difference estimate, identifying 
how the effect of a health shock on employment transitions is influenced by ECHI.  β3 captures 
differences in employment transitions between those with and without ECHI, and without a 
health shock, to account for unmeasured differences between workers with ECHI and insurance 
through the spouse’s employer (non-ECHI) that are correlated with remaining employed. 
Equation (2) is a re-parameterization of the more standard difference-in-difference 
specification 
Ei2 = α + β1’HSi12 + β2’ECHIi1 + β3’HSi12·ECHIi1 + Xiγ + εi2,       (3) 
where β3’ is the conventional difference-in-difference estimator.  The formulation in equation (2) 
yields direct estimates of the effects of health shocks for the two groups.  The models are 
equivalent, with the same differentials or effects captured in different combinations of the 
coefficients. 
We estimate the same type of model to study insurance loss where the same parameters 
capture how the source of health insurance influences the effect of a health shock on the loss of 
insurance.
  
In all estimations, we control for individual, job, and spouse characteristics. Individual 
characteristics include age (20 to 39, 40 to 59, 60 to 64), education (high school or less, some 
college, college degree or higher), race (white or other), and household income.
ii  Job 
characteristics include indicators for whether the job involves a lot of physical activity or stress.
iii
  
We control for part-time employment, employment in the public sector, and firm size.  We also 9 
 
include a dummy variable indicating that one or more dependents are insured through the 
respondent’s ECHI. 
Finally, we add variables to capture the employment situations of spouses at the first 
interview.  We include dummy variables for spouses not working, working part-time, or retired, 
which are related to the dependency of the household on the respondent’s employment, and we 
include a control for the spouse’s self-reported health status.  There are also controls for whether 
the spouse is older than 65 and if the spouse is insured by the respondent’s health insurance plan, 
both of which address the need to maintain health insurance for the spouse.  
2.1  Misclassification bias 
We categorize men by whether they have ECHI or have health insurance through a 
spouse.  However, Madrian
[10] reported that 36% of men with their own health insurance have the 
option to switch to their spouse’s policy.  This type of measurement error would tend to dampen 
the estimated differential in the labor supply response to a health shock when using ECHI to 
classify whether one is dependent on one’s own job for health insurance.   
We therefore experimented with alternative comparison groups and specifications of 
ECHI.  First, we restrict the sample to married men with non-missing information on their wife’s 
insurance (this reduced the sample size by about 15%).  Men with and without ECHI are 
included in this sample.  We assume that employed women with employer-provided health 
insurance have the option of covering their husbands.  The HRS does not specifically ask 
respondents without employer insurance if they can cover their husbands, and instead only asks 
if health insurance is available through their employer.  Using this information, and assuming 
that if health insurance is available they could cover their husband, we construct an alternative 
comparison – between men who either rely on their wife’s health insurance or have the option to 10 
 
switch to their wife’s health insurance to men with ECHI and no option to switch to a wife’s 
plan.  Next, we estimate these models with the inclusion of single men, assumed to have no other 
insurance option if they have ECHI.  And last, we further restrict the sample to men with ECHI 
and then compare those with and without the option to switch to their wife’s health insurance 
(results not reported; available upon request).   
2.2  Confounding with morbidity 
Morbidity from the health shock can confound the estimation of how incentives to 
maintain health insurance affect labor supply responses to ECHI.  A way to avoid this type of 
bias in the estimation of “employment lock,” and thereby to focus on how the health shock 
affects the labor supply response stemming solely from concerns about loss of insurance, is to 
distinguish between health shocks that cause immediate comorbidity and those that do not.  An 
additional advantage of this approach is that misclassification of the dependence on employment 
for insurance, if it exists, is likely to be similar across different types of health shocks, so this 
misclassification should not bias estimates of differential labor supply responses based on ECHI 
depending on the type of health shock.   
We therefore focus, in some of our analyses, on a narrower definition of health shocks – 
in particular, health shocks entailing a new diagnosis only, without either hospitalization or a 
self-reported decline in health.  This analysis isolates health shocks that do not entail an increase 
in morbidity that could affect a person’s ability to remain employed, but which entail increased 
future health care costs and hence the value of health insurance.  Doing so provides a cleaner test 
of the hypothesis that health insurance locks people into employment.  In contrast, health shocks 
that entail increases in morbidity (such as hospitalizations or self-reported declines in health) 
may reduce the likelihood of employment independently of ECHI’s incentives. Increases in 11 
 
morbidity that affect employment directly are most likely to trigger large self-reported declines 
in health, whereas new diagnoses without a large self-reported decline seem most likely to 
constitute mainly a “health cost” shock.   
A second implication of dependence on employment for health insurance is that those 
with ECHI may be at greater risk of losing insurance when they experience a health shock that 
increases morbidities, because such health shocks interfere with work.  Thus, we report analyses 
focusing on those with only an increase in morbidity (a self-reported decline in health), 
hypothesizing that these kinds of shocks are more likely to result in loss of health insurance.    
3. Data  
We use the HRS surveys from 1996 through 2008.  We selected all observations for 
which the respondent was interviewed in at least two consecutive HRS waves with non-missing 
data for the employment, insurance, health, demographic, and other variables we use.  We 
excluded the 1992 and 1994 waves because it is impossible to distinguish current versus former 
employer as the source of health insurance.  We narrowed the age range to 64 years or younger 
at the second interview to avoid respondents eligible for Medicare.
iv 
 We then selected the subset 
of observations in which the respondent was married, employed, and had employment-based 
health insurance (from their employer or union or their spouse’s employer or union
v) in the first 
interview of the pair.  Respondents were excluded if they were insured by a former employer, 
any government plan (e.g., Medicare, Medicaid, military insurance), or a privately-purchased 
policy, or were uninsured at the time of the first interview.   
We restricted the sample to healthy men.  We selected pairs of observations in which, at 
the first observation in the pair, the respondent had not previously been diagnosed with lung 
disease, cancer, stroke, diabetes, angina, or congestive heart failure.  We excluded observations 12 
 
of individuals who had been hospitalized more than once or for more than one night in the past 
two years, or who described their health status as poor or fair in the past two years.  An 
examination of this initially healthy sample isolates the effects of a new health event rather than 
an exacerbation of a chronic condition or accumulation of new health conditions.   
We define three types of adverse health events, henceforth referred to as health shocks.  
Given that self-reported health status is recorded as excellent, very good, good, fair, or poor, we 
define a health self-report decline (SRD) as a shift from “excellent,” “very good,” or “good” 
health status in the first interview to “fair” or “poor” health status in the second.  The second 
shock we use is a new diagnosis of cancer, lung disease, angina, congestive heart failure, or 
stroke, reported at the second interview.  Our third health shock measure is hospitalization on at 
least two occasions or for at least two nights between the first and second interview.  In addition, 
we look separately at health shocks consisting of only new diagnoses or only self-reported health 
declines in the same period, for reasons discussed earlier.  For those respondents who ultimately 
report a health shock, we select the pair of observations bracketing this adverse health event, 
because the incidence of health shocks in the sample is low.  For those respondents who never 
report a health shock, we randomly select one pair of observations.   
We define the ECHI group as those with primary health insurance from the current 
employer or union as of the first interview.  The non-ECHI comparison group includes those 
with insurance through their spouse’s employer or union.
vi 
We start with 39,896 consecutive-wave pairs of interviews on 10,258 men.  When we 
restrict the sample to those who are under age 65 at the second interview, and married and 
employed with health insurance through their own employer or their spouse’s employer as of the 
first interview, we are left with 2,160 observations.  After limiting the sample to men who 13 
 
initially reported good or better health, who had no prior diagnosis of any of the listed diseases, 
and who had not reported a hospitalization of more than one night or more than one 
hospitalization in the prior two years, we have 1,709 observations.  Excluding respondents with 
missing data on the variables required for our analysis, we arrive at the final sample of 
individuals, consisting of 1,582 men of which 1,379 had ECHI at the first interview, while 203 
were covered by their spouse’s employer (Table 1).   
  Table 1 also reports the number of men who experienced health shocks, by insurance 
source.  The most common health shock is hospitalization, which affected 209 men with ECHI 
and 36 men with spouse insurance.  A new diagnosis of the diseases listed above was reported by 
103 men with ECHI and 22 men with other insurance.  There were 171 men with ECHI and 25 
men with spouse employer insurance who had a self-reported health decline.  
  Table 2 provides information on the relationships between alternative possible health 
shock measures, including the individual diseases that make up new diagnoses.  Rates of 
hospitalization and self-reported decline (SRD) vary by diagnosis.  About 11% of respondents 
who are not diagnosed with lung disease, cancer, stroke, angina, or congestive heart failure self-
report a decline in health status, with the rate more than doubling for those with a new diagnosis 
of one type or another.  Cancer and strokes have the highest rates of hospitalization and SRD.  
These differences match our expectations concerning the different diseases; some diagnoses have 
little immediate impact on contemporaneous morbidity or quality of life, while strokes are 
immediately debilitating or life-threatening. 
  Thus far, we define the sample in terms of health shocks experienced by men.  However, 
if their spouse also experienced a health shock, then men with ECHI might be more likely to 
remain at work to cover their spouses.  Alternatively, men with insurance through their spouses 14 
 
might change their employment behavior to increase health insurance coverage, when their 
spouses experience a health shock.  In either case, correlations between men’s health shocks and 
health shocks to their spouses could lead to biased estimates of the effects of interest.  To isolate 
the effects of health shocks to the men in our sample, we also restricted the sample to men whose 
spouses did not experience health shocks between the first and second interview (using the same 
definitions as described above, applied to the spouses).  These restrictions resulted in a 26% 
reduction in sample size.  When we re-estimated our models using this more restricted sample, 
the results were qualitatively similar to results from models using the sample selected without 
regard to spouse health.  Therefore, we report results from our original larger sample.  
4. Results 
4.1. Descriptive statistics   
Table 3 reports descriptive statistics by health shock and insurance source.  Among men 
with ECHI at the first interview, 82% are employed at the second interview, the same percentage 
as for men with insurance through the spouse’s employer.  Most men with ECHI retain their 
health insurance through this source (76%) as of the second interview, and a few become 
uninsured (3%).  About a quarter (24%) of men with insurance through the spouse’s employer at 
the first interview gain ECHI by the second interview and only 2% become uninsured.  Most 
men with ECHI cover their spouse (65%) and many also cover other dependents (38%).
vii  Men 
with ECHI rather than insurance through their spouse, are, at the first interview, less likely to be 
employed part-time (p < .01), and more likely to work for larger employers (p < .01) and in 
stressful jobs (p < .01).  Men with ECHI are more likely to have spouses who do not work, who 
work part-time, who are retired, and who are in poor health (p < .01 in all cases).   15 
 
Relative to healthy men, the univariate comparisons suggest that health shocks involving 
either hospitalization or self-reported declines reduce employment (p < .01).  Men who have 
some kinds of health shocks are more likely to have physical jobs as of the first interview (p < 
.05).  Men with lung disease or hospitalizations are more likely to have older spouses (p < .01).  
Spouses of men with some types of health shocks are less likely to work part-time (p < .05 or 
.01) and, in the case of self-reported declines, more likely to be in poor health (p < .01).  
Respondents who experienced self-reported health declines were more likely to be nonwhite (p < 
.05) and had lower incomes and education levels (both with p < .01).     
4.2. Employment transitions 
Table 4 reports difference-in-difference estimates of the effects of specific disease-related 
health shocks on remaining employed for those with ECHI versus insurance from a spouse’s 
employer.  The first-difference estimates indicate that men with ECHI who are newly diagnosed 
with cancer are as likely to be employed at the second interview as are otherwise similar healthy 
men.  In contrast, for men with insurance through a spouse, those with a cancer diagnosis are 
more likely to be employed at the second interview, although the difference is not statistically 
significant.  Thus, the difference-in-difference estimate is negative and statistically insignificant. 
In contrast, the estimates for those newly diagnosed with lung disease indicate that those with 
ECHI are relatively more likely to remain employed after these health shocks.  The point 
estimate of the effect of the health shock is negative and relatively large for those with insurance 
through the spouse (non-ECHI).  The difference-in-difference estimate is positive, meaning that 
men who have ECHI and are newly diagnosed with lung disease are more likely to be employed 
than men with insurance through their spouse’s employer.  Despite the estimated differential 
being very large (28.7 percentage points), it is not statistically significant.   16 
 
Broader definitions of health shocks are reported in columns (3) and (4).  In these 
estimations, we find fairly consistent evidence that those with health shocks – whether they have 
ECHI or insurance through their spouse’s employer – are less likely to remain employed, as 
expected.  Moreover, for those with ECHI, the evidence of declines in employment is 
statistically significant for hospitalizations.  Nonetheless, the magnitudes of the simple-
difference estimates of the effects of health shocks on the two insurance groups are similar, and 
as a result we do not find statistically significant difference-in-difference estimates indicating 
that those with health shocks are more likely to remain employed if they have ECHI.  These 
latter estimates are near zero and alternate in sign, suggesting that the true effect may be near 
zero.   
In column (5), however, we find evidence consistent with the hypothesis that ECHI locks 
those with health shocks into employment.  For those with a new diagnosis only, the estimated 
employment effect for those with ECHI is positive and significant (a 19.8 percentage point 
differential, p < .01).  This evidence is consistent with the conjecture that new diagnoses in the 
absence of hospitalization pose less of a barrier for those with ECHI to keep working.  In the 
absence of a health shock, 18% of older men routinely leave employment over a two-year period 
(Table 3).  However, among those with a new diagnosis only and ECHI, the health shock does 
not affect employment.  The net result, as reflected in the difference-in-difference estimates, is 
that men with an adverse health shock that raises the value of health insurance without increasing 
morbidity are more likely to remain employed if they had ECHI prior to the shock.  The 
difference-in-difference estimate is large and positive – 30 percentage points – and statistically 
significant (p < .05).  For reasons explained earlier, we regard the evidence in column (5) as 17 
 
providing the cleanest test of the hypothesis that ECHI locks men into employment, because it 
isolates the effect of future health care costs and avoids the confounding effect of morbidity. 
4.3. Insurance 
Table 5 explores the extent to which employed men with different initial sources of 
health insurance remain insured following a health shock.  For both hospitalizations and self-
reported declines in health, the difference-in-difference estimates indicate that those with health 
shocks who have ECHI are more likely to lose their health insurance (p < .05 for hospitalization, 
and p < .01 for self-reported health declines).  The difference-in-difference estimates are to some 
extent driven by the positive simple difference estimates for those with insurance through the 
spouse, which are statistically significant.  These positive simple difference estimates imply that, 
among those with insurance through the spouse, those with health shocks are more likely to 
remain insured.  Because the insurance comes through the spouse, the health shock itself poses 
no barrier to remaining insured.  On the other hand, given the health shock, it is not surprising 
that these couples take steps to retain the health insurance through the spouse’s employer.   
When we look at new diagnoses in isolation, which should capture those with shocks that 
increase the value of health insurance but do not increase morbidity, we find no evidence that 
health shocks lead to insurance loss.  This is not surprising given the (relative) absence of an 
increase in morbidity, coupled with the increased future value of health insurance that boosts the 
relative employment of those with ECHI and this kind of health shock.  However, when we 
isolate those who have a self-reported health decline only – for whom we can better isolate the 
effects of morbidity on insurance loss – we find that those with ECHI are significantly more 
likely to lose health insurance.
viii   
4.4 Alternative estimations 18 
 
In our alternative estimations where we experimented with different comparison groups 
and specifications of ECHI, the difference-in-difference estimates were statistically insignificant 
in estimations predicting employment and insurance loss (results not reported; available upon 
request).  We do not believe these findings alter our main conclusions for four reasons.  First, 
there is an unknown degree of measurement error with regard to classifying potential insurance 
sources.  The HRS does not specifically ask women if they have the option to cover their 
husband on their insurance policy unless they are actually insured through their employer.  
Therefore, we cannot say for certain that having employer-based health insurance available is the 
same as being able to add a husband to the policy.  Second, health insurance policies differ in 
generosity of coverage, premiums, co-pays, and flexibility to choose providers, so policies held 
by the husband may not be equivalent to policies held by the wife.  
Third, it is likely that men do not perceive their wife’s job as a viable source for health 
insurance.  The older women covered by the HRS have, or had, fairly weak attachments to the 
labor force, and older women who are employed may work for firms with inferior benefits.  
Therefore, the availability of an option for health insurance outside of one’s own ECHI does not 
necessarily imply a reduction in employment lock because the alternative policy may be 
undesirable (particularly following a new health shock when relationships with new health care 
providers will be established and new services will be required).  In a prior published paper,
[8] we 
show that women with ECHI, regardless of whether their husband is offered health insurance, are 
more likely to be employed in the periods following breast cancer diagnosis relative to a group of 
similar women with insurance through a spouse who are not offered insurance through their own 
employer.  19 
 
We see the absence of significant difference-in-difference estimates for insurance loss in 
the alternative estimations with different comparison groups as reinforcing the view that the men 
in our sample generally do not regard the insurance their wives get through their jobs as a viable 
source of insurance.  If wives’ policies were a viable option, then when we reclassified men’s 
dependence on their own employment for health insurance based on whether their wives are 
offered health insurance on their jobs, the difference-in-difference estimate of the probability of 
insurance loss associated with a health shock and ECHI should increase, rather than diminishing.  
We regard the finding that this estimate diminishes as bolstering the ECHI/non-ECHI distinction 
to study employment lock or job-lock for men. However, this specification may not be equally 
appropriate for women, for whom the offer of health insurance through a husband’s job may be a 
viable substitute for ECHI through her own employer, because of better jobs and benefits and 
more permanent labor force attachment of men.  In a study of women newly diagnosed with 
breast cancer, we found that, among women with ECHI, those who had the option to switch to 
their husband’s insurance reduced labor supply by more than married women without the option 
to switch to their husband’s insurance.
[11]   
5. Discussion and Conclusions 
This study informs policies regarding employment-based health insurance along two 
dimensions – labor supply and continuity of health insurance.  Men with employer-provided 
health insurance appear to experience a form of job lock – or “employment lock” – following a 
health shock because of the incentives that employment-contingent health insurance (ECHI) 
creates.  In addition, those with ECHI are more likely to lose health insurance following some 
types of health shocks.     20 
 
Prior published papers on health shocks, employment, and source of insurance find 
related evidence for men and women with cancer,
[8-9] whereas in this paper we do not find such 
evidence for cancer-related health shocks.  The variation in results should not be viewed as 
surprising.  The samples are small and the studies use different definitions of health shocks, 
choices of control groups, and study periods.  Unfortunately, there is not a readily-available 
secondary dataset where the incidence of illness in working-age people is sufficiently high to 
definitively study the influence of ECHI on labor supply following a health shock in large, 
representative samples.  Therefore, the only feasible research strategy is to assemble evidence 
from disparate data sources, in an effort to see if a consistent and cohesive story emerges.   
An important contribution of this paper is the finding that differences in labor supply 
responses are driven by specific types of health shocks.  Health shocks associated with higher 
health care costs in the future but not with immediate increases in morbidity have a positive 
effect on labor supply for those with ECHI.  We interpret this evidence as reflecting labor supply 
responses to health shocks that increase expected future health care costs, but do not introduce 
contemporaneous health problems. This finding has implications for the job lock literature as 
well.  Research on job lock that does not distinguish between health shocks with and without 
immediate morbidity may understate the extent to which ECHI “locks” some workers into a job 
with health insurance.  
Two limitations are noteworthy.  First, we study a sample of married, employed, and 
initially-insured individuals.  Given the socioeconomic characteristics of married versus single 
older adults, and given that marriage often implies the availability of multiple sources of 
insurance, the HRS participants we study are less vulnerable to loss of employment and loss of 
insurance than the population at large.  Nonetheless, this sample provides a research design that 21 
 
allows us to isolate the effects of the source of health insurance more convincingly than if we 
compared the experiences of married, employed, adults with ECHI to those who were not 
married or were either uninsured or on public insurance.  Moreover, most people in the age range 
we study are married. Second, the HRS is confined to older individuals and our findings may not 
be applicable to those who are younger, although we view this as a minor drawback for studying 
the influence of health shocks, which are much more prevalent among older people.     
Our study indicates that, for some specifications of health shocks, ECHI encourages 
continued employment of men following a health shock.  Access to alternative sources of health 
insurance may reduce this employment lock after a health shock.  On the one hand, an enhanced 
ability to continue health insurance coverage without working could deliver health benefits, if 
men who would otherwise be constrained to keep working are instead better able to take the time 
to recover and to receive appropriate health care.  On the other hand, this is a potential cost of 
less reliance on employment for health insurance; like any policy that provides resources to those 




i The similarity may reflect the fact that men whose jobs provide health insurance are 
more likely to be highly-skilled men with higher incomes, while men who rely on their spouses 
for health insurance may also be relatively high-earning men, owing to assortative mating in 
marriage markets.  
ii In separate estimations, we included dummy variables for each two-year age group 
between 55 and 64, and for age under 55 years (an age range with few observations).  The results 
were virtually unchanged.
   
iii We dichotomize these into all/almost all of the time, most of the time, or some of the 
time versus none or almost none of the time.   
iv Most HRS respondents are near the upper end of this age range, although occasionally 
spouses of the target population are much younger.   
v As union membership is commonly tied to employment with a particular firm, it seems 
reasonable to assume that losing or changing jobs affects union-provided as well as employer-
provided insurance.  For this reason, we treat union insurance as ECHI.  However, the union-
insured workers make up less than 2% of the sample, and excluding them does not meaningfully 
change the results. 
vi As a short-hand, we refer to these two types of insurance as coming through the 
employer or the spouse’s employer. 
vii The small share of spouses covered by ECHI (6%) when the respondent is in the non-
ECHI group could reflect either both people in the couple having employer insurance and for 
some reason each being on the other employer’s plan, or reporting error.   23 
 
viii Because COBRA is available to those who experience a health shock, our evidence on 
responses to health shocks with regard to either remaining employed to retain insurance, or 
insurance loss, should be biased toward the null hypothesis of no differential effect of health 
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Table 1. Men under age 65, Health and Retirement Study, 1996 – 2008   
Sample inclusion criteria  Observations 
Consecutive-wave observations
a  39,896 
Individuals
  10,258 
Aged 18 to 64 years at 2
nd interview
b  5,253 
Married at 1
st interview  4,354 
Employed
c at 1
st interview  2,770 





No fair or poor health or hospitalization for more than 1 night or more 
than 2 occasions in the two years prior to first interview, and no 
previous diagnosis of cancer, lung disease, angina, or congestive heart 
failure 
1,709 
No non-valid missing data for required variables
  1,582 
Men with ECHI at 1
st interview  1,379 
   
New diagnosis of an included
e disease




nd interview  209 
Decline in health self-report
g between 1
st and 2
nd interview  171 




New diagnosis of an included
e disease




nd interview  36 
Decline in health self-report
g between 1
st and 2
nd interview  25 
aAn observation is defined as two consecutive interviews with the same individual. 
b ‘1
st interview’ and ‘2
nd interview’ refer to the pair of interviews that make up an observation. 
c Working for pay with positive earnings. 
d ECHI or insurance through the spouse’s employer includes current employer or union-based health insurance. It 
excludes privately-purchased or former employer-based insurance in addition to Medicare, Medicaid, and other 
government-provided health insurance.  “ECHI” refers to insurance from the respondent’s employer or union. 
e Included diseases are cancer, lung disease, angina, congestive heart failure, and stroke. 
f Hospitalized for at least 2 nights or on 2 occasions since the 1
st interview. 
g Health decline defined as a drop from excellent, very good, or good at the 1




Table 2. Probability of health shock by disease
 
New diagnosis  N  % Hospitalized 
% Decline in self-
report  % Neither  % Both 
None
a  1,457  13%  11%  78%  2% 
Any diagnosis
b  125  46%  26%  43%  14% 
Cancer  72  53%  26%  38%  17% 
Congestive heart 
failure 
2  0  0  100%  0 
Stroke  11  73%  36%  18%  27% 
Lung disease  35  29%  20%  57%  6% 
Angina  9  33%  33%  44%  11% 
a Did not report diagnosis of cancer, stroke,  angina, congestive heart failure, or lung disease, during the relevant 
period. 
b Reported diagnosis of cancer, stroke, angina, congestive heart failure, or lung disease, during the relevant period.   
Table 3. Sample characteristics 
a  
    Insurance source    Health shock 
    Spouse 
employer 
(non-ECHI)  ECHI 
 
Healthy  Cancer  Lung  Hosp
b  SRD
c 
N  203  1,379    1,140  72  35  245  196 




82%  82%    84%  85%  80%  76%***  75%*** 
Health insurance at 2
nd interview   ***             
Uninsured  2%  3%    3%  0  3%  3%  6% 
ECHI  24%  76%    70%  71%  63%  66%  67% 
Spouse   64%  4%    11%  14%  11%  13%  13% 
Government  1%  2%    2%  4%  3%  2%  3% 
Privately purchased  0%  2%    2%  1%  0  2%  3% 
Other  9%  12%    12%  10%  20%  14%  10% 
ECHI covers spouse  6%  65%***    58%  50%  57%  57%  59% 
ECHI covers other  1%  38%***    34%  28%  34%  32%  30% 
Age                 
Age under 40  0  1%    1%  0  0  0  0 
Age 40-59  70%  67%    67%  61%  60%  68%  72% 
Age 60-63  30%  32%    32%  39%  40%  32%  28% 
Nonwhite  9%  9%    8%  14%  6%  11%  14%** 
Education                *** 
High school or less  61%  60%    57%  61%  68%  61%  77% 
Some college  5%  5%    6%  4%  6%  4%  4% 
College degree  34%  35%    37%  35%  26%  35%  19% 
Annual income    **       
    ***
 
Under $20k  1%  1%    1%  1%  0  1%  1% 
$20k-$75k  37%  47%    44%  36%  60%  47%  60% 
Over $75k  62%  52%    55%  63%  40%  52%  39% 
Physical job  33%  35%    34%  31%  51%**  31%  42%** 
Stressful job  54%  64%***    62%  64%  54%  63%  64% 
Public sector job  4%  5%    5%  3%  3%  4%  4% 
Part-time job  14%  4%***    5%  3%  9%  5%  6% 
Employer size    ***             
Under 25 employees  32%  13%    16%  14%  17%  16%  15% 
25-99  17%  10%    11%  7%  6%  9%  13% 
100 or more  51%  77%    73%  79%  77%  75%  72% 
Spouse                 
Employed  96%  60%***    65%  65%  60%  64%  60% 
Part-time work  10%  20%***    21%  11%**  14%  11%***  12%*** 
Retired  2%  14%***    12%  15%  11%  16%*  11% 
Poor health  7%  15%***    13%  7%  14%  16%  20%*** 
Over 65  2%  4%    3%  4%  14%***  7%***  4% 
Notes: ECHI=employment contingent health insurance. 
Significance: 
* p<.1   
** p<.05   
*** p<.01 (columns (2) vs. (1) and columns (4)-(7) vs. (3)). 
a Except where specified, all characteristics refer to the 1
st interview. 
b Hospitalized for at least two nights or on two separate occasions between 1
st and 2
nd interviews. 
c Decline in self-report of health from good or better to fair or poor. 
Table 4. Probability remain employed,
a first differences and difference-in-difference
b from 
linear probability models, initially-employed married men under age 65 with employer-












  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
ECHI×health shock  -0.005  0.048  -0.084*  -0.015  0.198*** 
  (0.085)  (0.098)  (0.049)  (0.064)  (0.059) 
Non-ECHI×health shock  0.103  -0.239  -0.050  -0.034  -0.098 
(0.081)  (0.216)  (0.084)  (0.098)  (0.144) 
Diff-in-diff  -0.108  0.287  -0.034  0.019  0.296** 
  (0.093)  (0.223)  (0.076)  (0.093)  (0.145) 
N  1,212  1,175  1,385  1,265  1,192 
Treated  72  35  245  125  52 
Notes: ECHI=employment contingent health insurance; non-ECHI=health insurance through spouse’s employer. 
Significance: 
* p<.1   
** p<.05   
*** p<.01.   
a “Employed” is defined as working for pay. 
b First difference is (health shock employment – healthy employment) for the specified group (ECHI or non-
ECHI). Diff-in-diff is the difference between these effects. 
c Controls for first interview age under 40 or  40-59, nonwhite, some college, college degree or more, income 
under $20k, income more than $75k, physical job, stressful job, physical job×health shock, stressful job×health 
shock, firm size (25-100 or >100 employees), part-time work (fewer than 35 hours), spouse not working, spouse 
part time, spouse retired, spouse had bad health (fair/poor versus excellent/very good/good), spouse over 65, 
spouse covered by respondent’s employer-based insurance, dependents covered by respondent’s employer-based 




Table 5. Probability remaining insured, first differences and difference-in-difference
a from linear probability models, 
initially-employed married men under age 65 with employer-provided health insurance 










  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7) 
ECHI×health shock 
 
0.027**  0.033  -0.004  0.033**  0.026  0.033  0.027 
(0.013)  (0.024)  (0.024)  (0.014)  (0.022)  (0.022)  (0.025) 
Non-ECHI×health shock  0.048  0.064**  0.042*  0.051**  0.098***  0.039  0.102*** 
(0.030)  (0.028)  (0.024)  (0.026)  (0.028)  (0.030)  (0.034) 
Diff-in-diff  -0.021  -0.032  -0.046**  -0.018  -0.072***  -0.006  -0.074** 
  (0.030)  (0.023)  (0.022)  (0.022)  (0.026)  (0.018)  (0.032) 
N  1,212  1,175  1,385  1,265  1,336  1,192  1,270 
Treated  72  35  245  125  196  52  130 
Notes: ECHI=employment contingent health insurance; non-ECHI=health insurance through spouse’s employer. Controls are the same as in Table 
4. 
Significance: 
* p<.1   
** p<.05   
*** p<.01.   
a First difference is (health shock insured status – healthy insured status) for the specified group (ECHI or non-ECHI).  Diff-in-diff is the difference 
between these effects. 
 